Mapping the Rights Apparatus by Maurer, Bill
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
Volume 16 | Issue 2 Article 6
January 2004
Mapping the Rights Apparatus
Bill Maurer
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh
Part of the History Commons, and the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Yale
Journal of Law & the Humanities by an authorized editor of Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
julian.aiken@yale.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bill Maurer, Mapping the Rights Apparatus, 16 Yale J.L. & Human. (2004).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol16/iss2/6
Mapping the Rights Apparatus
Richard A. Wilson, The Politics of Truth and Reconciliation in South
Africa: Legitimizing the Post-Apartheid State. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001. Pp. xii, 271. £47.50 (cloth); £16.99 (paper).
Bill Maurer*
Critical studies of human rights have hit an impasse. On the one hand,
the relativist critique of rights is caught in the horns of the dilemmas that
have trapped relativism more generally. When relativists declare that
rights are not part of a particular cultural world, or that rights can do harm
by commodifying relations or things that were once integral to people's
lifeways, relativists re-institute cultures as the kind of definable,
objectifiable entities that their critique of rights as objectifying "culture"
sought to challenge. When relativists seek to discover "local" or
"indigenous" conceptions of rights, or to find a least common denominator
shared by all the world's cultures that will ground a new conception of
rights (such as the lex talionis, or the eye-for-an-eye conception of
justice),' they undermine their own claims of cultural
incommensurability.2
On the other hand, the universalist conception of rights has got caught
in the dilemmas besetting all universalisms. When universalists proclaim
the applicability of rights to all humans, they institute the human as having
a particular form, stripping people of all particulars and rendering the
human as "bare life," thereby participating in the regime of rights that
Hannah Arendt famously compared to the charters of societies for the
protection of humans to animals.' Humans in the universalist conception
of human rights appear to be no more than a mere body, and particular
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types of humans-one thinks immediately of the figure of the child-get
elevated to the status of archetypal victims of human rights abuses.
Supposedly divested of the trappings of culture and experience that would
make their rights claims always suspect because always already-interested,
such figures of bare human existence operate in political discourse only as
the raw material from which biopower makes its knowledges and its
raison d'gtre.
The global reach of human rights discourses today, and the status
human rights have assumed as an unquestioned good, have led
anthropologists of law to reevaluate the relativism/universalism debate.
Jane Collier argues that in spite of her appreciation of cultural difference
and incommensurability, she is "not alarmed by the spread of human
rights discourses around the world" because human rights is "a language
of argument."4 Human rights contain contradictions and inconsistencies,
not to mention their uneven enforcement, and so Collier turns her critical
and ethnographic attention to the "languages of argument" that constitute
"human rights" rather than assuming there is any unified coherence to
them. Furthermore, Collier observes that the tension between enforcing
universal rights and respecting cultural difference is internal to liberal
legal orders. Rational people must possess their own distinctive
"traditions" in order to make a claim to self-determination and to resist the
yoke of others' laws. Self-government demands distinctive selves to be
governed. Elizabeth Povinelli points to the way liberal legal orders
demand otherness-but not too much otherness-as grist for the liberal
mill of transcending difference. "Be other," liberal law exhorts, "so that
we do not ossify."5 Liberalism's others provide it with the difference that
warrants law's power as transcendent arbitrator and mediator.
Richard A. Wilson's book on the workings of the South African Truth
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) presents a remarkably novel, and
necessary, intervention in this conversation. It is a book of signal
importance for anyone interested in the critical appraisal of rights
discourses and the anthropology and sociology of law in general. But it is
also important for studies of bureaucratic knowledge and administrative
technique, and even the field of science and technology studies. Seeking to
trace the "social life of rights,"'6 Wilson provides a rich and compelling
story of the relationship between human rights discourses and the
techniques that social-scientific and legal positivisms share for the
4. Jane F. Collier, Durkheim Revisited: Human Rights as the Moral Discourse for the
Postcolonial, Post-Cold War World, in HUMAN RIGHTS: CONCEPTS, CONTESTS, CONTINGENCIES 63,
73 (Austin Sarat & Thomas Kearns eds., 2002).
5. Elizabeth A. Povinelli, Radical Worlds: the Anthropology of Incommensurability and
Inconceivability, 30 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 319, 329 (2001).
6. RICHARD A. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA:
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production of truth. Locating his study within the debate over states'
transitions from authoritarianism, Wilson shows us how rights are never
quite what they seem. In this case, rights became a means of nation-
building. In the process of empowering a notion of national healing
through "truth-telling," the TRC, Wilson argues, closed down the
possibility of securing the criminal or civil prosecutions of the perpetrators
of apartheid's worst crimes and banal injustices. It did so not simply
because of the ideological proclivities of elites, the negotiations among
powerful interest groups and parties, the successful deployment of an
essentialized notion of "African culture," and so on, though it did in part
because of all these things. What Wilson documents is how the TRC
unwittingly shut down retributive justice in favor of restorative justice via
a set of administrative and social-scientific techniques for gathering data
and assessing truths that dovetailed with the legal positivism of rights
discourse and presented the kinds of truths necessary for stitching together
a national project.
Indeed, what comes across most clearly in Wilson's book is the extent
to which a certain "procedural liberalism," heralded as essential to the
establishment of the rule of law in transitioning states or fledgling
democracies, is itself called forth through a specific bureaucratic and
knowledge-generating apparatus. While one story here is the way the TRC
was involved in the production of "official histories" for a newly imagined
nation and the "manufacture [of] legitimacy for key state institutions,"
especially those maligned through their tight association with the
apartheid regime,7 the other, more compelling tale has to do with the
technology for creating and managing the truths of the apartheid era.
Some of the implications of the latter story make Wilson nervous. There
are very interesting moments in the text where it becomes apparent that
Wilson has had to choose whether to go down a path that would take him
far from the practices and politics of the TRC, restorative versus
retributive justice, nation-building after authoritarianism, and the specifics
of the South African context. That path would lead to a far-reaching
critique, not only of rights discourses and practices, but of the very modes
of inquiry that would attempt to assess, modify or challenge them. Indeed,
this book about a truth and reconciliation commission provides insight
into the commission of truth. I am interested in what Wilson can tell us
about this commission, in the sense in which one commits an error, or a
sin, or commissions a work of art.
Wilson documents the "legal fetishism"8 of rights talk in societies
undergoing transition, and the way the TRC's legalistic encoding
7. Id. at xvi.
8. Id. at 28.
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dissipated political questions and left to one side structural issues in the
South African state in order to build a foundation for the new, post-
apartheid nation. He cautions that law, human rights and reconciliation
cannot be separated from "nation-building, legitimization and the
centralization of state power."9 And despite their being touted as a route
toward re-legitimizing the state, truth and reconciliation commissions'
actual record is quite mixed. Indeed, Wilson argues that "reconciliation
was the Trojan horse used to smuggle an unpleasant aspect of the past
(that is, impunity) into the present political order, to transform political
compromises into transcendental moral principles."' He is critical of
Desmond Tutu's invocation of supposed principles of "African
jurisprudence" under the heading of the term ubuntu, which include
restorative justice, respect for human dignity, social solidarity,
community, and so forth-the obvious alternatives to retributive justice,
individualism, retaliation or vengeance. Wilson cites the amnesty granted
to the killers of Amy Biehl as a "public relations coup" managed through
the language of ubuntu," and ethnographically documents that vengeance
and retribution had more of a place in oppositional discourses outside
Johannesburg where Wilson conducted ethnographic fieldwork.
In the book's two most "ethnographic" chapters, Wilson explores two
communities in which legal authority, reconciliation, and the relationship
between local and national governments played out very differently. In
Sharpeville, a "revenge ethic"' 12 took over as militarized youth and a lack
of local-level institutions fueled disputes culminating in violence. In
Boipatong, local courts with a high level of community legitimacy have
channeled vengeful passions into retributive justice involving public
beatings.' 3 The beatings are deemed proportionate to the crime; they can
be severe, yet the guilty parties submit to them for fear of the white-
dominated police station where they may face torture. There is no bail (in
violation of human rights standards), yet suspending the rights of the
accused protects them from the kind of vigilante justice they would face in
Sharpeville. Together with the way state human rights discourses have
appropriated elements of Christian redemption and forgiveness, the
contrast between Sharpeville and Boipatong helps Wilson paint a picture
of a plural and discontinuous sociolegal field. Wilson concludes that the
situation calls for a re-evaluation of legal pluralism and an
acknowledgment of the way the "social processes described [in the book]
work in different directions simultaneously, both reinforcing and
9. Id. at 29.
10. Id. at 97.
11. Id. at 92.
12. Id. at 163.
13. Id. at 205.
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obstructing the introduction of human rights values into a context of semi-
autonomous legal and moral fields."'
14
But it is the chapters on the "truth-making machine" 15 of the TRC that I
find most compelling. Wilson rightly sees the denunciatory modality of
critique as one of the main failings of the TRC. The TRC, Wilson shows,
in eschewing a unifying theoretical framework for its findings, relied
instead on a notion of decontextualized, ahistorical "evil" to explain away
the horrors of the past.' 6 Denouncement took the place of systematic
analysis and understanding, while restorative justice removed the
possibility of retribution. Yet it is the truth-making apparatus of the TRC
itself that foreordained this outcome. Wilson provides fascinating and
important material on the co-emergence of human rights information
management systems and human rights regimes around the world. The
TRC's Information Management System, dubbed Infocomm, was charged
with collecting, documenting and collating the various kinds of data that
would make up the "truth" of the TRC's final Report.
Wilson shows how the bureaucratic structure of the TRC, the legal
positivism of rights, and the quantitative statistical methods of social
science worked to create different "parcels of truth" in four distinct
modes: factual or forensic truth, personal or narrative truth, social truth,
and healing and restorative truth.' 7 These four modes of truth were
actually named and defined as such in the TRC Report. The Report gave
no recommendations about the analysis or interpretation of these truths.
This had two main effects. First, most of the truths collected fell under
forensic or narrative paradigms, since these were the most amenable to the
standard social-scientific methodologies of counting things and
conducting interviews. Second, forensic truth emerged as the only one of
the four modes of truth to carry any epistemological weight, for a number
of reasons. It was deemed the only truth capable of providing a real
history of the apartheid era, since the other modes of truth were "there for
emotional 'catharsis' and nation-building."' 8 But it also dominated the
others for purely technical reasons. Statement-takers who collected case
narratives could only conduct their work at a slow pace, given the nature
of the enterprise, and thus became the bottleneck in the information
management system. To remedy the slowing flow of information,
Infocomm instituted a standard checklist modeled on the forms a paralegal
might use in gathering the facts of a case. Infocomm modified the
checklist over time, so that by the time of the TRC's final Report there had
14. Id. at 222.
15. Id. at 33.
16. Id. at 34, 55.
17. Id. at 36-37.
18. Id. at 37.
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been five different versions of the form. Each successive version-termed
a "protocol"--sought to eliminate room for "mistakes" and increase the
acquisition of "cold facts."' 9 The database drove the model: the statistical
modality of truth production "selectively classiflied] social reality and in
turn shape[d] how that reality [was] analyzed."' It decontextualized,
flattened, and ultimately erased "experiential truths."'"
One might expect the final product of this process of truth-making to be
a grand narrative organized through statistical summary charts and the
stability and security of knowledge that statistical procedures warrant, but
this was not the case. Instead, despite the epistemological priority of the
forensic mode of truth, each of the kinds of truth found their place in the
TRC's final Report. The result, however, was a disconnected text, a non-
narrative (or even anti-narrative) account that offered "no authoritative
perspective on the past. . . . Instead, the various sections-statistical
analysis of patterns of abuse, chunks of testimony from hearings, and short
background research pieces-lie side by side, unconnected."22 Wilson
criticizes the Report for decontextualizing and fragmenting cases and
narratives, and decries its lack of integration. The lack of an authoritative
narrative leaves only the modality of denunciation, as any systematic
analysis of social conditions, crime and politics was "bypassed in favor of
the moral category of 'evil' which resolves the problem of meaning: Why
did people commit gross human rights violations? Because of the evil
system of apartheid. End of story."23
Wilson's call for context goes together with his backpedaling on the
question of those statistical methodologies. "My point is not that forensic
and positivist forms of documentation do not have their place," he
writes.24 Rather, he calls for a "wider vision of writing history" instead of
"narrow legalism and an unreflective quantitative sociology."25 Here,
however, Wilson might have instead asked what the truth-making machine
of the TRC says about the truth-making machines of sociolegal,
anthropological, or other forms of critical inquiry. To the disconnected
text of the Report, Wilson counterposes "context" and "wider visions" of
what historiography might be. Yet I cannot help but wonder whether the
disconnect, the lack of resolution felt upon reading the Report, itself
problematizes the very notion of contexts and wider views (which always,
by definition, demand a widening of the lens to even greater contexts and
even broader views). Might the perspectival aesthetic Wilson seeks itself
19. Id. at 44.
20. Id. at 47.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 52.
23. Id. at 54.
24. Id. at 57.
25. Id. at 58.
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dissipate into the forms of legal and sociological positivism he hesitantly
criticizes? Might it not also lead us back down the tracks of the
relativism/universalism debate, revealing the bankruptcy of this very
paradigm? Wilson himself suggests another strategy, to one side of what
we might call the perspectival modality of truth: a strategy that inquires
into truth's technique-its commission, as it were.
This book is so important because it represents a novel approach to the
critique of rights. It focuses on the techniques and procedures that procure
rights and their forms of knowledge. It links social-scientific knowledge
formation with the creation of rights by looking at techniques of "truth" in
truth and reconciliation commissions. This puts into question the
analytical enterprise itself. Although Wilson doesn't quite jump into that
abyss, his book suggests how one might do so with both analytical force
and style.
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